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External and internal influences on R&D alliance formation:  
Evidence from German SMEs 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Relying on relational capital theory and transaction cost economics (TCE), this study 
identifies factors that impede or promote alliance formation in small to medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). Environmental uncertainty and knowledge intensity impede firms’ R&D alliance 
formation; the focal firm’s overall trust in partners enhances alliance formation. Trust interacts 
positively with environmental uncertainty and knowledge intensity to affect alliance formation in 
SMEs. The findings reflect data from a longitudinal sample of 854 German SMEs, captured over 
eight years from 1999 to 2007.  
 
Keywords: Trust, Knowledge Intensity, Environmental Uncertainty, Alliance, R&D, SMEs 
 
3 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Firms engage increasingly in collaborative, interfirm alliances to complement and 
supplement internal activities and to create a bridge with the external environment (Doz and 
Hamel, 1998; Faems, Janssens, Madhok, and VanLooy, 2008; Marino, Lohrke, Hill, Weaver, 
and Tambunan, 2008). Extant literature identifies several benefits of alliances, including a 
stronger competitive position through greater market power (Kogut, 1991), increased efficiencies 
(Ahuja, 2000), access to new or critical resources or capabilities (Lee, 2007; Rothermael and 
Boeker, 2008), new market entry, and new products (Lai and Chang, 2010). These benefits lead 
scholars to suggest that firms form alliances to fulfill resource needs, such as access to new 
assets (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1990; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991), and learning from 
partners (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000; Kogut, 1988). However, if the benefits from 
alliances are ubiquitous, why don’t all firms form alliances (Ahuja, 2000)? The answer may 
involve the costs of alliance formation, which relate to the uncertainty associated with future 
relationships and arise from both firm-specific factors and the environment in which a firm 
operates.  
Firms do not base alliance decisions solely on resource requirements; rather environment-
specific and firm-specific factors interact and jointly determine a firm’s alliance decision (Koza 
and Lewin, 1998; Park, Chen, and Gallagher, 2002). By entering an alliance, the firm opens itself 
to opportunistic behaviors by partners (Parkhe, 1993). This concern is especially salient for small 
to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with knowledge-based products and technologies that have 
relatively less bargaining power than large firms (Lavie, 2007). In addition to firm-specific 
factors, a high level of environmental uncertainty may deter SMEs from engaging in alliances. 
To alleviate such concerns, trust often plays a central role early by mitigating apprehensions of 
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potential opportunistic behaviors (Adobor, 2005). In turn, SMEs’ relational capital, in the form 
of inter-partner trust, should encourage alliances and reduce concerns related to knowledge 
leakage and uncertainty.  
Several scholars recommend extending this approach to understand firm motivations to 
engage in alliances (Wassmer, 2010). For example, Park and Zhou (2005: 550) urge researchers 
to ―delineate the direct relationships between the specific attributes of a firm and environment 
and the firm's alliance decisions‖ by identifying how ―internal and external attributes would 
interact with each other to determine a firm’s response to competitive dynamics by forming 
alliances with others.‖ The present study responds to those calls with a joint consideration of the 
influence of firm-specific and environmental factors, integrating arguments from transaction cost 
economics (TCE) with relational capital theory. Specifically, a firm’s general level of trust 
toward business partners should facilitate the formation of R&D alliances. Knowledge intensity 
and environmental uncertainty from TCE likely impede SME alliance formation, whereas 
interpartner trust is a relational resource that encourages alliance formation. The TCE-based 
explanations also are contingent on the level of interpartner trust. Accordingly, this research adds 
to literature on antecedents of alliance formation (e.g., Lohrke, Kreiser, and Weaver, 2006; 
Marino et al., 2008) by using actual alliance formation likelihood as a dependent variable in a 
longitudinal setting. Furthermore, uncertainty related to misappropriation of firm-specific 
resources is more salient when environmental uncertainty is high and the alliances are 
knowledge intensive. Because trust may help firms cooperate despite uncertainty (e.g., Dyer and 
Chu, 2003), research that examines such contexts can produce useful insights into when the net 
benefits of trust are possible. Finally, SMEs differ from their larger counterparts in terms of 
higher resource constraints (Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips, 2004; Krishnan, Martin, and 
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Noorderhaven, 2006), and this examination of German SMEs provides a useful departure from 
large, U.S. firm–oriented studies.  
The longitudinal data represent 3,694 firm-year observations of German SMEs, gathered 
in two extensive surveys conducted in 2003 and 2007. As expected, environmental uncertainty 
has a negative influence, and trust has a positive impact on SME R&D alliance formation. 
Further, greater levels of interpartner trust positively moderate and change the direction of the 
relationship between knowledge intensity and alliance formation; a higher level of interpartner 
trust weakens the negative effect of environmental uncertainty on R&D alliance formation.  
2. Conceptual background 
In interfirm alliances, independent firms collaborate to exchange, share, and jointly 
develop products, services, or technologies (Lavie, Lechner, and Singh, 2007; Teng, 2007). The 
interorganizational designs are often strategic in nature, providing ―the means by which a firm 
seeks to implement, in part or in whole, elements of management’s strategic intent‖ (Ariño, 
2003: 67). To co-create value, firms form alliances with business partners, customers, and even 
competitors (Doz and Hamel, 1998; Ybarra and Turk, 2009) and thus may be able to generate 
new products, reduce costs, and expand into newer markets (Faems et al., 2008; Lai and Chang, 
2010). Alliances also provide conduits of technology and organizational learning (Johnson and 
Sohi, 2003). Thus firms engaged in alliance activities report 11% higher revenue and 20% higher 
growth rates than standalone firms (Ybarra and Turk, 2009).  
Firms form alliances for two compelling reasons. First, research based on economics and 
strategic management posits that resource complementarity, quests for power, and the potential 
of synergistic value creation may drive firms to form alliances (Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991; 
Wassmer, 2010). Second, sociological perspectives argue that social structures play important 
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roles in alliance formation, and firms’ direct and indirect relational experiences assist the 
formation of future ties (Adobor, 2005; Gulati, 1999; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). In either case, 
alliances are engines of value creation, and yet not all firms engage in alliances. Extant literature 
does not provide satisfactory answer as to why (Ahuja, 2000). 
To answer this question, the present study examines factors that prevent firms from 
engaging in alliances. Unlike the resource-based view, which focuses mainly on the benefits of 
alliances, TCE notes problems related to uncertainty and the risk of opportunistic behavior by 
alliance partners (Gulati, 1995; Li, Eden, Hitt, and Ireland, 2008; Williamson, 1985, 1991). This 
theory also posits that the threats of opportunism and misappropriation increase with greater 
levels of environmental uncertainty. Transaction costs consist of both ex ante forms—such as 
developing, drafting, and negotiating agreements with appropriate safeguards and the risk of 
adverse selection—and ex post types—such as the costs to execute, scrutinize, and maintain 
contracts or deal with moral hazard, holdup, and maladaptation. Firms try to reduce both the ex 
ante and ex post costs and the underlying uncertainty, by choosing an appropriate governance 
form, such as standalone status versus alliance formation (Williamson, 1996).  
Uncertainty can emanate from the environment (environmental uncertainty) or potential 
threats of opportunistic behavior by partners (behavioral uncertainty). The threat of opportunistic 
behavior becomes particularly salient in technology-intensive alliances (Krishnan et al., 2006; Li 
et al., 2008). Again, the threats of opportunism and misappropriation increase with higher levels 
of environmental uncertainty. Ex ante, when faced with higher levels of uncertainty firms 
monitor potential partner activities more intensively (e.g., excessive contingency clauses); ex 
post, when faced with unforeseen contingencies, they also likely engage in renegotiation. Thus 
TCE suggests that at higher levels of uncertainty, and when faced with a strategic dilemma about 
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whether to engage in an alliance or not, the focal firms prefer standalone status to hedge against 
proprietary knowledge leaks, loss of control, or inflexibility (Krishnan et al., 2006; Sutcliffe and 
Zaheer, 1998).  
Reliance on trust-based relational governance may provide a way to deal with such 
contingencies (Dyer and Chu, 2003; Dyer and Singh, 1998). Thus knowledge-specific alliances 
and their potential for misappropriation entail the central constructs of TCE, uncertainty and 
asset specificity (Chen and Chen, 2003; Pisano, 1990; Sampson, 2004). Accordingly, 
environmental uncertainty and a firm’s knowledge intensity should affect the firm’s likelihood to 
form an alliance, as well as the extent to which the firm’s trust in business partners influences 
that decision. This reasoning reflects the recognition that firms base their alliance decisions on 
resource requirements, as well as environmental and firm-specific factors (Koza and Lewin, 
1998; Park et al., 2002). Also, SMEs should note the strong potential for opportunistic behaviors 
by larger or wealthier partners, especially if those SMEs rely on knowledge-intensive products 
and technologies (Lavie, 2007). If SMEs also discern high environmental uncertainty, the firms 
are unlikely to enter alliances, which would increase overall uncertainty. However, if the SMEs 
participate in trust-based alliance relations, a form of relational capital, the firms should 
experience fewer knowledge misappropriation concerns and uncertainty and thus engage in 
alliances.  
3. Hypotheses development 
3.1. Environmental uncertainty and alliance formation 
A perceived inability to evaluate and predict future changes in external environmental 
conditions indicates environmental uncertainty (Dess and Beard, 1984; Dickson and Weaver, 
1997; Milliken, 1987), which exerts significant influences on organizational processes and 
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strategy (Dollinger and Golden, 1992; Marino et al., 2008; Walker and Weber, 1987) and plays a 
pivotal role in alliance formation. However, empirical research offers mixed findings regarding 
the strength and direction of the influence of environmental uncertainty on alliance formation, 
perhaps due to the multidimensional nature of the construct.
1
 Dickson and Weaver (1997) find 
that though general, technological, and internationalization uncertainty increase the likelihood of 
alliances, customer demand and competitor uncertainty are impediments. Dollinger and Golden 
(1992) categorize environmental uncertainty into munificence, dynamism, and complexity; 
munificence and complexity increase alliance usage, but environmental dynamism has no 
significant effect.  
Research that advocates a positive relationship between environmental uncertainty and 
alliance formation (e.g., Dollinger and Golden, 1992; Dickson and Weaver, 1997) asserts that 
collaborative designs reduce uncertainty through shared risks, pooled resources, attenuated 
competition, and new market opportunities (Dickson and Weaver, 1997; Kale and Singh, 2009). 
However, concerns related to the misappropriation of strategic assets remain a central feature of 
interfirm collaborations (Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter, 2000), which increase in conditions of 
heightened uncertainty associated with unpredictable changes in market demands, competition, 
and technology. Such dynamic environments may discourage firms, especially SMEs, from 
forming alliances.   
First, unpredictability and sudden changes in the external environment increase 
information processing demands (Tushman and Nadler, 1978) and even may force firms to alter 
their strategic postures. Inherent uncertainties associated with alliances include opportunistic 
behaviors, uncertain costs and benefits, and management ambiguities (Chung, Singh, and Lee, 
2000). Luo (2007) shows that alliance partners’ opportunism depends on environmental volatility 
                                               
1 We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this to us. 
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and increases with rising uncertainty in the environment. These uncertainties are particularly 
prominent in R&D alliances, which demand relationship-specific and other types of resource 
commitments to succeed.  
 Environmental uncertainty also requires ―organizations to engage in significant scanning 
of their environment in search of accurate and reliable information that enables them to interpret 
and act upon the threats and opportunities facing them‖ (Krishnan et al., 2006: 897). Alliance 
formation and management initiates a series of important processes: partner selection, contract 
negotiation, mode selection, knowledge and process coordination, performance monitoring, 
performance evaluation, and so on (Kale and Singh, 2009). These processes entail significant ex 
ante and ex post transaction costs. When environmental uncertainty is high, managers of SMEs, 
already burdened by significant information processing demands, may have more difficultly 
assessing the future value of an R&D alliance, which increases ex ante transaction costs. Larger 
firms with more resources can deal with this difficult environment, but smaller firms with 
resource constraints cannot adapt easily to uncertain environments (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985; 
Podolny, 1994). Thus SMEs may prefer to deploy their limited resources to tackle environmental 
uncertainty rather than create more uncertainty by forming alliances. Consistent with this, 
Krishnan et al. (2006) find that SMEs are less likely to create strategic alliances when the market 
is uncertain. Therefore,   
H1: The level of environmental uncertainty that SMEs face relates negatively to 
the likelihood of alliance formation.  
 
3.2. Knowledge intensity and alliance formation 
Knowledge is an important strategic resource (Grant, 1996). Knowledge intensity refers 
to the extent to which the production process of the focal firm involves specialized and unique 
knowledge or technology that may provide a competitive advantage (Autio, Sapienza, and 
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Almeida, 2000; Subramani and Venkatraman, 2003). Knowledge intensity arises from the 
development of production process–specific routines and operating procedures that ensure the 
efficient and effective production of outputs.  
Because R&D alliances often involve upstream sharing of tacit knowledge and the 
development of new knowledge (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006), opportunities for 
misappropriation and leakage arise. Firms that possess more knowledge-intensive outputs thus 
may be cautious in creating R&D alliances (Kale et al., 2000; Sampson, 2004). Lavie (2007) 
suggests that not all firms have the same ability to appropriate value from alliances but that 
appropriation capacity depends on the firm’s relative bargaining power. With their smaller 
resource base and size, SMEs tend to have relatively less bargaining power in alliances. In turn, 
SMEs face the risk of being too dependent on partners or losing crucial strategic information 
during alliance formation (Chi, 1994; Hamel, 1991), to the possible detriment of a competitive 
advantage (Bleeke and Ernst, 1995).  
For these reasons, SMEs may hesitate to engage in R&D alliances and prefer to retain 
knowledge-intensive activities under their own umbrella (Chen and Chen, 2003). Hierarchical 
control has advantages over alliances or market control in terms of exploiting asset 
interdependencies that can lead to a sustainable advantage (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Because 
of the shared language and routines that develop within firms, tighter coordination between 
existing know-how and incoming knowledge is possible with hierarchical control than market 
control (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). 
Knowledge-intensive activities thus tend to remain in-house, maintained to create 
dynamic capability. Such activities or resources also allow the firm to configure effectively in 
response to dynamic, turbulent environments. Researchers suggest a cautious approach to 
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determining which business functions or processes to outsource or keep under hierarchical 
control (Steensma and Corley, 2001). R&D alliances are created mainly for new product 
development and are characterized by higher level of interdependencies (Sampson, 2004.). 
Interdependencies may require partner firms to share valuable knowledge-intensive resources 
and be subject to hold-up problems (Chen and Chen, 2003; Park and Russo, 1996). Shared 
knowledge-intensive resources also increase the potential for misunderstandings about each 
partner’s intents and contributions to the alliance. With their size, SMEs have little bargaining 
power over larger firms and fewer resources to search for reliable alliance partners to alleviate 
opportunism concerns. Therefore, SMEs with knowledge-intensive resources should be tentative 
about forming R&D alliances. In other words,  
H2: An SME’s existing level of knowledge intensity relates negatively to the 
likelihood of alliance formation.  
 
3.3. Trust and alliance formation 
Trust has received significant attention in the organizational literature (Gaur, Mukherjee, 
Gaur and Schmid, 2011). Lewicki et al. (1998: 439) define trust as ―confident positive 
expectations regarding another’s conduct.‖ In the context of a dyadic relationship trust refers to 
focal firm’s expectation that the exchange partner will not act opportunistically (Gulati and 
Nickerson, 2008).  Distinguishing between interpersonal trust and interorganizational trust, 
Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone (1998: 143) argue that the latter ―describes the extent to which 
organizational members have a collectively held trust orientation towards the partner firm.‖ As a 
multidimensional construct, trust may also have competence and intentional dimensions (Faems 
et al., 2008; Nooteboom, 1996). Competence engenders positive expectations about partner 
firms’ ability to perform in line with existing agreements; intentional or goodwill trust instead 
refers to exchange partners’ intentions to avoid opportunistic behavior. The present study adopts 
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Zaheer et al.’s (1998) conceptualization of trust and posits that the existing level of trust that the 
focal firm in general has in its business partner firms facilitates exchange relationships (McEvily, 
Perrone, and Zaheer, 2003; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer, 1998; Zaheer et al., 1998). 
Gaur et al. (2011) have used a similar conceptualization of trust between a focal firm and its 
business partners. Trust produces organizationally valued outcomes, such as reduced transaction 
costs and enhanced organizational performance (Adobor, 2005; Lee and Cavusgil, 2006; Luo, 
2008).  
 Relational capital and social network perspectives indicate that a firm’s ability to 
establish new alliances also depends on network structures (Beckman et al., 2004; Mitsuhashi 
and Greve, 2009). Extending this argument, a firm’s existing level of trust in business partners 
may encourage future alliances: Trust enables firms to solve mutual problems and conflicts that 
arise during the alliance; in this sense ―trust stands out as one of the internal conditions that 
appear particularly critical at the onset of strategic alliances‖ (Koljatic and Silva, 2008: 649). 
Indeed, Luo (2008) argues that the level of trust a particular firm has in existing business 
partners and suppliers affects the likelihood of alliance formation.  
Social capital gained from the existing level of trust can also enhance firm confidence 
and increase the chances of future alliance creation. Trust embedded in organizational norms and 
routines becomes a guiding factor for alliance formation behavior. It provides assurance to the 
focal firm that the potential alliance partner will not take advantage of its vulnerability even if 
such opportunities exist (Chaturvedi and Gaur, 2009). Thus, a greater level of existing trust may 
allow focal firms to avoid the drafting of rigid and complex contracts which are inherently 
expensive. In addition, trust-based relationships enrich the knowledge base of the focal firm for 
managing collaborative relationships with more efficiency and effectiveness. Potential partners 
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can form the alliance more easily if the focal firm already has trust-based relationships with 
existing partners. Information regarding the trustworthiness of an exchange partner should 
alleviate the potential threat of opportunism and lower transaction costs and uncertainties 
associated with extensive partner searches. Accordingly, the existing level of trust should 
encourage alliance formation by the focal firm. 
H3: An SME’s existing level of trust in business partners relates positively to the 
likelihood of alliance formation.  
 
3.4. Trust as a moderator  
Collaborative relationships, such as R&D strategic alliances, require a balance between 
protecting the firm’s proprietary assets and establishing trust with an exchange partner 
(Hagedoorn, 2002). The R&D alliances likely involve mutual transfers of strategic information 
and sensitive technological knowledge but relatively weak incentives to prevent leakage (Das 
and Teng, 2002). Although managers can mitigate the risk of misappropriation by structuring 
each partner firm’s payoffs according to alliance outcomes (Kogut, 1988), relational risk may 
dissipate the firm’s competitive advantage (Bleeke and Ernst, 1995).  Consequently, trust of the 
focal firm in its business partners in general can act as a safeguarding mechanism and mitigate 
uncertainties associated with future displays of opportunism (Dyer and Singh, 1998).  
3.4.1. Moderating effect of trust on environmental uncertainty–alliance formation 
relationship. Environmental uncertainty may discourage R&D alliance formation in SMEs for 
two reasons: First, in uncertain conditions, managers choose not to overburden themselves with 
more information processing demands. Second, when environmental uncertainty rises, SMEs do 
not find the unforeseen contingencies associated with R&D alliances attractive enough to 
establish long-term partnerships. Trust can alleviate both concerns: SMEs with more trust in 
existing business partners agree to rely on those partners somewhat ―blindly‖ and form alliances 
14 
 
 
(Krishnan et al., 2006). Rapid information processing demands decrease, because trust offers an 
assurance of reduced opportunistic behaviors (McEvily et al., 2003).  
Similarly, trust allows for greater flexibility in responding to changing environmental 
conditions, facilitates investments in relation-specific assets, and reduces transaction costs 
associated with costly monitoring and other formal safeguarding mechanisms (Dyer and Chu, 
2003; Nooteboom, Berger, and Noorderhaven, 1997). In terms of enhanced exchange value, trust 
mobilizes parties to share more knowledge and pursue relational governance mechanisms that 
substitute for costly contracts (Lee and Cavusgil, 2006; McEvily et al., 2003). With external 
uncertainty, trust motivates actors to collaborate fully and integrate activities in a way that 
effectively coordinates the task and resource interdependencies associated with an economic 
exchange relationship. Trust may also motivate partners to engage in value-creation initiatives 
that are difficult to specify explicitly in a contract. Thus, a high level of trust in the partner firm 
makes alliance formation rational. An SME with high level of trust should perceive that an 
alliance partner will maintain salient promises and commitment. Accordingly,  
H4: The level of trust the focal firm has in business partner firms attenuates the 
negative effect of environmental uncertainty on alliance formation. 
 
3.4.2. Moderating effect of trust on knowledge intensity–alliance formation relationship. 
The presence of trust orientation in exchange relationships lead to more accurate and timely 
information exchange (Nooteboom et al., 1997), which may help the focal firm better understand 
business partners. The focal firm’s trust in its partner firms reduces transaction costs at different 
stages of a transaction, thereby enhancing the likelihood of collaborative behavior. For example, 
in a trust-based relationship, partners often draft flexible contracts to accommodate ex post 
contingencies and deviations, which reduce the costs of drafting a complex contract. Moorman, 
Zaltman, and Deshpande (1992) report that trust enables entities to find fruitful solutions to 
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conflicts and facilitates problem solving. Such an approach also reduces transaction costs related 
to expensive negotiations and extensive partner monitoring (Dyer and Chu, 2003; Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; McEvily et al., 2003).  
 Although SMEs with knowledge-intensive production outputs should avoid R&D 
alliances, for fear of opportunistic behaviors by alliance partners, extant findings in trust-related 
research suggest that trust can mitigate the threat of perceived opportunism. An SME with an 
overall trust orientation may be less concerned about exploitation by potential alliance partners. 
Forming alliances with others may enhance an SME’s legitimacy, and the prevalence of trust 
orientation may encourage firms to form alliances. Thus,  
H5: The level of trust the focal firm has in business partner firms attenuates the 
negative effect of knowledge intensity on alliance formation.  
 
4. Methods 
4.1. Sample  
The empirical tests involve a sample of SMEs in Germany. This sample provides a useful 
alternative to extant research, which relies mostly on large enterprises from the United States and 
United Kingdom. In addition, constructs such as trust and uncertainty should affect these 
resource-poor SMEs more than they do larger firms.  
The sample identification relied on two criteria: (1) firm turnover should not be more 
than one billion Euros, and (2) the firm should not be listed on any stock exchange. The Institut 
für Mittelstandsforschung Bonn notes approximately 100,000 manufacturing firms in Germany. 
Of these, approximately 8,000 are listed, and 90% of the remaining firms are micro- and very 
small enterprises, with fewer than 10 full-time employees. These exclusions leave a population 
of approximately 10,000 SMEs. Addresses were available for nearly 40% (3,978) of these SMEs, 
which provides a good representation of the population of SMEs in Germany.  
16 
 
 
4.2. Data collection 
Questionnaires addressed to CEOs and top management team members were 
administered twice, in September 2004 and June 2007. The first survey consisted of three rounds 
and produced 705 completed questionnaires, with information on alliance formation during 
1999–2003. The removal of questionnaires with missing information on key variables left a final 
sample of 565 questionnaires, for a 14.2% response rate, comparable to alliance-related surveys 
in other countries (e.g., 14.4% in China, Isobe, Makino, and Montgomery, 2000; 18% in India, 
Krishnan et al., 2006). The second survey round, three years later, again solicited the firms that 
responded in the first round (705). After one reminder, 308 completed questionnaires arrived 
over two months. After discarding 10 partially completed questionnaires, the final sample 
consisted of 298 firms that provided alliance formation data for 2004–2006. The combination of 
the two surveys provided longitudinal data on alliance formation and other firm characteristics 
for eight years (1999–2006).  
The tests for response bias followed the procedure suggested by Oppenheim (1966) and 
compared responses received in early and late rounds. The t-tests indicated no significant 
differences between early and late respondents in either survey round. In addition, a comparison 
of the industry composition of the respondents to the 2007 survey with that of nonrespondents 
from the 2003 survey revealed no differences in the industrial makeup of the respondents, which 
offered a reasonable assurance against nonresponse bias.
2
 
4.3. Dependent variable 
To measure the incidence of a new alliance formation, respondents listed the number of new 
alliances they formed in each of the eight years of the study period. These alliances might 
                                               
2 A more appropriate test of nonresponse bias would compare respondents and nonrespondents on key 
characteristics. However, this test was impossible, due to the lack of data on SMEs in secondary sources. 
17 
 
 
include various interfirm linkages, such as licensing and distribution arrangements or joint 
ventures. Most firms undertook only one alliance per year, so the dependent variable is a 
dichotomous variable, equal to one if the firm forms an alliance in a given year, and zero 
otherwise. 
4.4. Explanatory variables 
Knowledge intensity, environmental uncertainty, and trust are the key explanatory 
variables. Knowledge intensity relates to a firm’s use of technical skills during the production 
process, traditionally measured with proxies such as R&D expenditures and number of firm 
patents. However, these measures are less appropriate for SMEs (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 
1990; Spender and Grant, 1996), which rarely have distinct R&D departments and engage less in 
patenting; the number of patents an SME holds likely reflects a strategic positioning rather than 
knowledge intensity (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). Therefore, a better measure of 
knowledge intensity in SMEs relies on managerial assessments (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 
1990). Four items, with a seven-point Likert scale, measure knowledge intensity.  
Environmental uncertainty consists of environmental dynamism and environmental 
complexity. In line with extant research, unpredictable changes emanating from competitive, 
market, and technological environments represent the pertinent sources of uncertainty for the 
sample firms (Gaur et al., 2011; Dias and Magrico, 2011). The related three-item measure of 
environmental uncertainty follows definitions proposed by Duncan (1972), Milliken (1987) and 
Galbraith (1973). Finally, the measure of interorganizational trust comes from Gaur et al. (2011). 
The survey instrument appears in Appendix A.  
4.5. Control variables 
The control variables include firm size, age, capital structure, R&D intensity, advertising 
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intensity, and prior performance. Firm size equals the natural logarithm of total sales. Age is the 
number of years since the firm’s inception to the year of observation. Both firm size and age can 
influence alliance formation activities (Wassmer, 2010). The control for the capital structure of 
the firm uses the debt-to-equity ratio, which suggests the availability of slack resources owned 
by the firm (Bühner, 1987) and influences the firm’s decision to enter into alliances. For R&D 
intensity, the measure uses the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales; advertising intensity is 
the ratio of marketing expenditures to total sales. Because alliance formation aims to gain access 
to intangible assets (Wassmer, 2010), it is important to control for the intangible asset base of a 
firm, as represented by R&D and advertising intensities. Finally, prior performance, as measured 
by return on assets, controls for the organizational slack that firms may use to acquire resources 
in the external market rather than through alliances. 
5. Results 
5.1. Measurement properties 
 The evaluation of the convergent and discriminant validity of the measures relies on a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with AMOS 16.0. The theoretical constructs in the CFA—
trust, uncertainty, and knowledge intensity—appeared in a larger survey. The test of overall 
model fit used maximum likelihood; the latent variables should correlate with each other. The 
chi-square statistic often is sensitive to a large sample size, but the CFA results of the 
measurement model in Table 1 indicate excellent fit with the data (  = 151.14, root mean 
square error of approximation [RMSEA] = .056, goodness-of-fit index [GFI] = .96, adjusted 
goodness-of-fit index [AGFI] = .95, normed fit index [NFI] = .92, confirmatory fit index [CFI] = 
.94) (Gefen, Straub, and Boudreau, 2000; Hu and Bentler, 1999). The results in Table 1 also 
indicate that several combinations of constrained models do not fit the data well.  
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-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
The results in Table 2 indicate further support for the convergent validity of the 
measures. Each factor loading is greater than twice the standard error (Anderson and Gerbing, 
1988), which implies that each loading is significant at p = .01 (Gefen et al., 2000). The lowest 
ratio of loading to standard error is 8.31 (Table 2). All factor loadings are significant at p = .001. 
The composite factor reliability values, which assess the internal consistency of a measure, vary 
from .64 to .74. These findings offer robust support for the convergent validity of the items in 
each scale.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Three methods serve to test the discriminant validity of the measures. First, all 
intercorrelations between the latent variables, except trust and knowledge intensity (.68), are less 
than .60 (Table 3). Second, the average variance extracted values, which measure the amount of 
variance captured by a construct compared with variance due to random measurement error, are 
less than the .50 limit (Fornell and Larcker, 1981), as Table 2 shows.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Third, a constrained analysis sets the correlation of one pair of variables (e.g., trust and 
knowledge intensity) to 1.0 and tests the model fit again. According to Anderson and Gerbing 
(1988), the constructs are theoretically different (i.e., discriminant validity) when a chi-square 
difference test indicates support for the original model. The different chi-square values and 
various fit indices for the constrained models in Table 1 indicate that the model fit statistics of 
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the original three-factor model are significantly better than those of the constrained models, in 
strong support of discriminant validity and the unidimensionality of the measurement scales.  
5.2. Hypotheses testing 
The reliable and valid scales support the development of composite factor scores for the 
three variables from the principal component analysis. Factor scores, with a mean of zero and 
standard deviation of one, are preferable to averaged scores, because the different factors can be 
orthogonal, which reduces the problem of multicollinearity. Table 4 presents the descriptive 
statistics and correlations. The average number of alliances is .12, which suggests that 439 firms 
undertook alliances during 1999–2006. The formal test of multicollinearity used the variance 
inflation factor statistic; the highest value was 2.26, too low for any multicollinearity concerns.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
For the test of the theoretical model, panel data logit estimation involves building the 
models in a hierarchical manner, to ensure the results remain stable. Model 1 features all the 
control variables; Model 2 contains the three main effect hypotheses; Models 3 and 4 accept the 
interaction effects one by one; and Model 5 includes all hypothesized effects. Table 5 presents 
the results of the panel data estimation. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
 In support of H1, perceived environmental uncertainty relates negatively to the likelihood 
of alliance formation; the beta coefficient for environmental uncertainty is negative and 
significant (Model 2: β = -2.038, t < .001). However, the beta coefficient for knowledge intensity 
is not significant, suggesting that knowledge intensity does not relate negatively to a firm’s 
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alliance formation likelihood; H2 is not supported. . In line with H3, which predicts that 
interorganizational trust increases the likelihood of alliance formation, the beta coefficient of 
trust is positive and significant (Model 2: β = 1.685, t < .001). The signs and significance of these 
hypothesized effects remain the same across different models. 
In Models 3 and 4, the addition of the interaction terms significantly improves model fit; 
the significance of interaction terms thus is not a spurious relationship. Although H4 predicts that 
trust attenuates the negative effect of environmental uncertainty on alliance formation likelihood, 
the beta coefficient of the interaction between environmental uncertainty and trust is negative 
and significant (β = –.643, p < .001), so H4 receives no support. Finally, H5 predicts that trust 
attenuates the negative effect of knowledge intensity on the likelihood of alliance formation. The 
beta coefficient for the interaction between knowledge intensity and trust is positive and 
significant (β = .368, p < .01). Despite the lack of a significant direct effect of knowledge 
intensity, the significant interaction effect suggests that firms with high degrees of knowledge 
intensity are more likely to form alliances if the level of trust in business partners is high, in 
support of H5.  
6. Discussion and implications 
This study attempts to enhance understanding of alliance formation by focusing on firm-
level (knowledge intensity, trust) and environmental (environmental uncertainty) determinants. 
Thus the study addresses two research questions: (1) To what extent do external and internal 
factors affect SME alliance formation? and (2) How does existing level of interpartner trust 
influence the relationship of production knowledge intensity, environmental uncertainty, and 
alliance formation? The empirical analyses indicate that environmental uncertainty has a 
negative, significant impact on SME alliance formation, but interfirm trust encourages such 
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collaborative designs. Contrary to expectations, trust has no moderating impact on the 
environmental uncertainty–alliance formation relationship. In addition, no evidence emerges of 
constraining influences of knowledge intensity on SME alliance formation. However, interfirm 
trust positively interacts with knowledge intensity to predict alliance formation.  
6.1. Research implications 
This study adds to the nuanced understanding of the relationships among interpartner 
trust, knowledge intensity, environmental uncertainty, and alliance formation. First, the present 
work contributes to the alliance literature by identifying environmental uncertainty and 
production process knowledge intensity as possible deterrents to SME alliance formation. 
Second, interpartner trust is a precursor of SME alliance formation, in line with theory that 
identifies prior ties and partner social capital as attractive partner attributes during alliance 
partner selection (Beckman et al., 2004). Third, this study finds that trust can alleviate concerns 
of potential misappropriation by partners in knowledge-intensive exchanges. However, trust 
cannot offset concerns related to the unpredictability of the external environment. This finding 
corroborates the view that external uncertainty may not be managed by relational governance 
(Beckman et al., 2004). However, the threat of behavioral uncertainty gets mitigated by higher 
levels of trust, which alleviate apprehensions of opportunism. These findings suggest that 
environmental and behavioral uncertainty have differential impacts on SMEs’ strategic choices.  
This discussion requires consideration of the finding of the negative relationship between 
environmental uncertainty and alliance formation likelihood in SMEs, which contradicts the 
theoretical tenets of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancick, 1978) and results of 
some other related studies (e.g., Marino et al., 2008).  Resource dependence theory specifies that 
firms rely on alliances to obtain complementary resources and power when faced with greater 
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environmental uncertainty. However, this article subscribes to the view that SMEs seek more 
control in the face of increased uncertainty and avoid alliance formation which may reduce their 
flexibility (Williamson, 1985, 1991). This is in line with recent findings that firms prefer greater 
flexibility under conditions of higher external uncertainty.  For example, Ning, Boulding, and 
Staelin (2010) observe that firms choose non-equity alliances over joint ventures when external 
uncertainty increases as the former indicates greater flexibility. Applying the same logic the 
findings of this study suggests that when faced with increased uncertainty SMEs may emphasize 
external conditions and prefer their standalone status which provides greater flexibility. 
However, it should be noted that the findings also might reflect the high degree of uncertainty 
avoidance that marks German culture (Hofstede, 1980).  
Another interpretation of the negative effect of environmental uncertainty on alliance 
formation likelihood might turn to Milliken’s (1987) conceptualization of three types of 
environmental uncertainty: state, effect, and response uncertainty. State uncertainty arises when 
managers fail to predict how environmental components will change; for this study context, 
perhaps environmental dynamism deters German SMEs from entering alliances. Effect 
uncertainty occurs when managers cannot predict whether or how a specific change may 
influence their organizations. Finally, response uncertainty refers to a lack of knowledge about 
the response alternatives or consequences of an environmental change. Managers in an SME may 
not always know what strategy is possible in response to an environmental change or what effect 
an environmental change will have on organizations. Thus SMEs facing higher levels of 
uncertainty may avoid forming alliances.   
The finding with regard to the negative relationship between knowledge intensity and 
alliance formation is also noteworthy in the context of the SMEs.  This result implies that 
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knowledge intensive SMEs are less likely to form strategic alliances as such firms are more 
apprehensive about the possible misappropriation of their knowledge assets.  This is in tune with 
the transaction cost perspective which emphasizes the importance of opportunism in exchange 
relationships.  This particular finding also makes sense from a resource dependence slant as it 
indicates more knowledge intensive SMEs are simply less resource constrained and therefore are 
less reliant on alliance formation.  
Finally, this study provides an opportunity to test arguments from multiple perspectives. 
Organizational scholars call for international views on strategy and SME research that test extant 
theories and perspectives in non-U.S. contexts (Gaur et al., 2011; Singh, Gaur, and Schmid, 
2010). Accordingly, this research contributes meaningfully to strategy literature by drawing fresh 
attention to alliance research in general and the factors that facilitate or impede alliance 
formation in particular.  
6.2. Managerial implications 
The research findings have important managerial implications for both focal firms and 
business partners. Top managers of partner organizations should develop and maintain strong 
trust-based relationships to alleviate concerns of opportunism, especially pertaining to strategic 
knowledge. Ideally, organizations assist each other in moving from a formal contractual 
relationship to a more relational form of governance, in the interest of joint value creation. 
Managers should understand that uncertainty arising from the external environment may have a 
detrimental effect on alliance formation. Thus, managers of the SMEs need to scan the 
environment continuously and devise strategies to mitigate potentially negative impacts. 
Appropriate measures such as proactive environmental scanning, planning, or proactive 
networking endeavors may prevent such negative effects. The findings also imply that in 
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conditions of higher internal uncertainty, faced with knowledge-leakage concerns, managers 
should continue relying on trust-based governance while managing R&D alliances.  
7. Limitations and further research  
The results of this study should be interpreted with appropriate caution. First, this 
analysis only surveys German SMEs in the manufacturing industry. Additional studies should 
extend the research to other countries, larger companies, and service industries. Second, the data 
collection did not provide details on alliance types. Further studies could examine how the 
antecedents or reasoning underlying alliances vary depending on the nature and structure of the 
alliances. For example, equity-based alliances may alleviate concerns related to opportunistic 
behavior by creating ―mutual hostage‖ situations (Steensma, Marino, Weaver, and Dickson, 
2000). There is a rich body of literature examining the governance structure of alliance 
relationships; exploring the antecedents of alliance governance structure is beyond the scope of 
this research.  
Third, the data collection used a key informant survey methodology, which raises 
concerns about common method bias. However, published sources of financial information on 
SMEs are not readily available. Fourth, though this study notes three important factors that affect 
alliance formation, other factors—such as organizational resources, capabilities, environmental 
munificence, current strategy, or previous alliance experience—also could influence SME 
alliance formation.  Unfortunately, this study could not examine these factors due to the 
limitation of the data.  The quality of previous alliance experience, in particular, has been found 
to be important predictor of alliance formation.  We have very few firms in our sample which 
enter into more than one alliance during the study time period.  An indicator variable to control 
for firms that have more than one alliance is not significant in the regression models.  A 
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meaningful extension of this research would investigate other firm-level and external factors that 
may play important roles for alliance formation by SMEs.  
In conclusion, alliance formation depends partially on factors related to the external 
environment, transaction characteristics, and relational characteristics. This study integrates the 
relational perspective with transaction cost economics, applied to the context of R&D alliance 
relationships. This study sets the stage for further empirical research relating to alliance 
formation, involving other internal and external variables in different research settings.  
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Table 1. Fit indices, CFA model 
Model 2 (d.f.) RMR RMSEA GFI AGFI NFI TLI CFI 
Hypothesized Model 
151.14 
(41) 
.076 .056 .969 .951 .924 .924 .943 
Constrained Model 2 (trust and 
knowledge intensity) 
259.95 
(42) 
.288 .078 .951 .923 .870 .853 .888 
Constrained Model 3 (trust and 
environmental uncertainty) 
679.50 
(42) 
.499 .133 .895 .836 .660 .570 .672 
Constrained Model 4 (knowledge 
Intensity and environmental 
uncertainty) 
738.19 
(42) 
.529 .139 .901 .844 .631 .531 .642 
 
 
Table 2. Measurement properties 
Construct Items 
Unstandardized 
Loading 
SE 
Standardized 
Loading 
Item 
Reliability 
Composite 
Factor 
Reliability 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted 
Trust 
Trust 
1 
1.031 0.124 0.413 0.171 
0.644 0.642 0.321 
Trust 
2 
1.161 0.121 0.461 0.213 
Trust 
3 
1.328 0.138 0.655 0.429 
Trust 
4 
--  0.687 0.472 
Knowledge 
Intensity 
KI1 0.906 0.079 0.548 0.300 
0.667 0.667 0.334 
KI2 0.904 0.077 0.595 0.354 
KI3 0.975 0.081 0.567 0.321 
KI4 --  0.599 0.359 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
EU1 0.879 0.053 0.739 0.546 
0.739 0.723 0.492 EU2 0.664 0.049 0.541 0.293 
EU3 --  0.799 0.638 
 
 
Table 3. Interfactor correlation coefficients 
Items   Estimate 
Trust <--> Knowledge Intensity .683 
Trust <--> Environmental Uncertainty -.500 
Knowledge Intensity <--> Environmental Uncertainty -.578 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
a
  
 Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Alliance formation (=1) 0.12 0.32 --          
2. Sales 
b
 4.41 1.04 0.34 --         
3. Age 36.90 16.72 0.14 0.49 --        
4. Prior performance (ROA) 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.28 --       
5. Leverage 2.71 0.88 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.26 --      
6. Advertising 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 --     
7. R & D  0.02 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.15 -0.01 0.08 --    
 8. Trust 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.41 -0.08 -0.03 0.05 --   
9. Environmental uncertainty 0.00 1.00 -0.10 -0.01 -0.08 -0.39 0.05 0.09 -0.12 0.00 --  
10. Knowledge intensity 0.00 1.00 -0.03 0.16 0.16 0.44 -0.17 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 -- 
a n = 3694; Pearson correlations > |.090| significant at .05 level 
b Natural logarithm.  
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Table 5. Results of panel data logit estimation (DV: alliance formation = 1)  
Variables
a
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Sales
a
     2.321*** 0.238 3.001*** 0.317 3.131*** 0.328 3.011*** 0.314 3.170*** 0.328 
Age  -0.046*** 0.014 -0.060*** 0.017 -0.064*** 0.017 -0.059*** 0.017 -0.064*** 0.017 
Prior performance (ROA) -0.887*** 0.190 -2.105*** 0.274 -2.146*** 0.280 -2.070*** 0.274 -2.099*** 0.283 
Leverage -0.549*** 0.151 -0.571*** 0.177 -0.619*** 0.179 -0.555** 0.177 -0.594*** 0.179 
Advertising  -0.191 0.124 -0.068 0.152 -0.050 0.155 -0.052 0.152 -0.031 0.155 
R & D -0.049 0.125 -0.138 0.156 -0.195 0.162 -0.137 0.155 -0.196 0.163 
           
Environmental uncertainty (EU)
b
 (H1)   -2.038*** 0.249 -1.981*** 0.257 -2.019*** 0.243 -1.933*** 0.255 
Knowledge Intensity (KI)
b
 (H2)   0.124 0.193 0.047 0.192 0.078 0.194 -0.030 0.195 
Trust
b
 (H3)   1.685*** 0.215 1.678*** 0.219 1.709*** 0.216 1.718*** 0.223 
           
EU*Trust (H4)     -0.643*** 0.175   -0.735*** 0.185 
KI*Trust (H5)       0.368** 0.154 0.446** 0.155 
           
Log likelihood    -876.93 -783.21 -775.99 -780.29 -771.88 
Wald χ²        108.64 142.93 140.67 149.35 144.63 
Wald test χ²         34.29*** 32.03*** 40.71*** 35.99*** 
n=3694 firm-year;  
a Transformed to natural logarithm. 
b Factor scores from principal component analysis.  
* p < .05. 
** p < .01. 
*** p < .001 (all two-tailed). 
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Appendix A: Survey Scales 
Environmental Uncertainty (α = .723) 
 
1. The industry the firm is operating in is characterized by low entry barriers. 
 
2. Your firm is operating in a market characterized by fast changing and hard to predict market 
demands. 
 
3. The technological standards in your industry are changing at a high pace. 
Knowledge Intensity of the Production Process (α = .667)  
 
1. Specialized knowledge and technology required for your production process is easily available 
in the market (reverse coded).  
 
2. The economic value added during the production process is high.  
 
3. Special knowledge required for the production process is equally divided among different 
members in the organization. 
 
4. Much time has been spent acquiring the procedures necessary for the demands of your 
customers. 
 
Interorganizational Trust (α = .642) 
 
1. In contact with business partners you never had the feeling of being misled. 
 
2. The longer the business relationship with a partner lasts, the better and faster the 
understanding of the partner is. 
 
3. You remain cautious to new business partners until they prove that they are trustworthy. 
(reverse coded) 
 
4. You cover everything in watertight contracts while dealing with your business partners. 
(reverse coded) 
